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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                 
 
 NO. 94-1221 
 NO. 94-1241 
                 
 
 VALHAL CORPORATION, 
 
        Appellee/ 
        Cross-Appellant, 
 
 v. 
 
 SULLIVAN ASSOCIATES, INC., 
 ARCHITECTS, PLANNERS, ENGINEERS, 
 
        Appellant/ 
        Cross-Appellee. 
 
 
                               
 
 SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
 
     BEFORE:  SLOVITER, Chief Judge, STAPLETON, 
      MANSMANN, GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, 
      COWEN, NYGAARD, ALITO, ROTH, LEWIS, McKEE and 
      SAROKIN, Circuit Judges 
 
 
  The petition for rehearing filed by appellee/cross-
appellant in the above-entitled case having been submitted to the 
judges who participated in the decision of this Court and to all 
the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular 
active service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having 
asked for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit judges of the 
circuit  
  
in regular active service not having voted for rehearing by the 
court in banc, the petition for rehearing is denied.  Judge 
Hutchinson would grant in banc rehearing for the reasons set 
forth in his attached Statement Sur Denial.  Judge Greenberg 
joins in Judge Hutchinson's Statement Sur Denial. 
       By the Court 
 
 
 
       /s/Theodore A. McKee 
        Circuit Judge 
 
 
Dated: March 20, l995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 STATEMENT SUR DENIAL OF REHEARING IN BANC 
Nos. 94-1221 & 94-1241 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge 
 
 
 Neither the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania nor its 
Superior Court has yet decided whether clauses in contracts for 
professional services limiting the damages a contracting party 
can recover for negligent performance are enforceable.  The Court 
concludes they are valid under applicable state law.  The 
district court concluded they are not, and I believe their 
validity can be fairly characterized as doubtful.  Nevertheless, 
because Sullivan's contract with Valhal for professional services 
has a clause that attempts to limit Sullivan's liability to 
$50,000, this Court reverses a $1,000,000 judgment for appellee 
Valhal and then holds that the case must be dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  I believe this confuses the 
jurisdictional issue concerning the amount in controversy with 
the merits, deprives both parties of the binding judgment to 
which they are entitled and ignores our obligation to exercise 
subject matter jurisdiction when it is present.  Moreover, it has 
real practical significance to the parties as a non-merits 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not foreclose Valhal from 
commencing a new action in a state trial court seeking the same 
relief it did in the district court.  See, e.g., Local 1498, 
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 
AFL-CIO, 522 F.2d 486, 492 (3d Cir. 1975); Fratto v. New 
Amsterdam Casualty Co., 252 A.2d 606, 607 (Pa. 1969). 
  
Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with the Court's mandate 
directing dismissal of this case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.1 
 In Saint Paul Mercury Indemn. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 
U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938), the United States Supreme Court held 
that the amount a diversity plaintiff claims controls 
determination of the jurisdictional amount unless it appears to a 
"legal certainty" that (1) the claim was really for less than the 
jurisdictional amount, (2) the plaintiff could not recover more 
than the jurisdictional amount, or (3) the amount claimed is 
merely colorable.  I recognize the Supreme Court 's statements in 
Red Cab that Congress has restricted diversity jurisdiction and 
that courts must rigorously enforce this intent.  Id. at 288.  
However, the Supreme Court in Red Cab went on to state: 
 The rule governing dismissal for want of 
jurisdiction in cases brought in federal 
court is that, unless the law gives a 
different rule, the sum claimed by the 
plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently 
made in good faith.  It must appear to a 
legal certainty that the claim is really for 
less than the jurisdictional amount to 
justify dismissal.  The inability of 
                     
 
   1I realize that many jurists feel federal diversity 
jurisdiction is an outmoded burden on federal district courts 
facing burgeoning increases in cases involving federal question 
jurisdiction as Congress responds to problems it sees as national 
in scope.  See Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views 
Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 Va. 
L. Rev. 1671 (1992).  Efforts to secure legislation limiting or 
sharply curtailing diversity jurisdiction, however, have not 
borne much fruit.  Therefore, we are still charged with deciding 
cases brought by citizens of diverse states when the amount in 
controversy is more than $50,000, and our jurisdiction is not 
affected by a merits disposition awarding the diversity plaintiff 
less than that amount. 
  
plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to 
give the court jurisdiction does not show his 
bad faith or oust jurisdiction.  Nor does the 
fact that the complaint discloses the 
existence of a valid defense to the claim.  
But if, from the face of the pleadings, it is 
apparent, to a legal certainty, that the 
plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed 
or if, from the proofs, the court is 
satisfied to a like certainty that the 
plaintiff never was entitled to recover that 
amount, and that his claim was therefore 
colorable for the purpose of conferring 
jurisdiction, the suit will be dismissed.  
Events occurring subsequent to the 
institution of suit which reduce the amount 
recoverable below the statutory limit do not 
oust jurisdiction. 
 
 
Id. at 288-89 (footnotes omitted).  Although old, Red Cab remains 
the seminal case on this issue. 
 This Court concludes today that Valhal's $2,000,000 
claim, on which it secured a jury verdict of $1,000,000 after the 
district court refused Sullivan's motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, is a case in which it appears to a 
"legal certainty" that the amount in dispute failed to reach the 
jurisdictional minimum.  I believe this holding confuses the 
jurisdictional question of legal certainty with the standard for 
judgment on the merits as a matter of law.  I also believe it 
ignores Red Cab's instruction that a diversity claim should not 
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction unless the 
allegation in the complaint that it is for more than the 
jurisdictional amount is made in bad faith.  Id.  On this record, 
I do not think it can be inferred that Valhal's $2,000,000 claim 
was made in a bad faith attempt to meet the jurisdictional amount 
  
of more than $50,000 that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 1993) requires 
in a diversity case. 
 The length and complexity of the analysis the Court 
uses to resolve the controlling issue of state law, not 
heretofore authoritatively decided, seems to me to belie any 
conclusion that Valhal's allegation that the amount in 
controversy is more than $50,000 could be seen from the outset to 
be false to a "legal certainty" and so was made in bad faith or 
was merely colorable.  It seems to me that these determinations 
should be made ex ante, not post hoc. 
 In addition, it is clear from Part II of the opinion 
that the Court, in directing dismissal of the case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, has incorrectly applied the standard 
of review applicable to a Rule 56 grant of summary judgment 
instead of the standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Reasonable 
jurists might indeed conclude that Valhal's claim should not 
survive summary judgment, an issue on which I am dubitante; but I 
think this record demonstrates that Red Cab's standard governing 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not met. 
 Moreover, none of this Court's own cases concerning 
dismissal of a diversity case for failure to meet the 
jurisdictional amount seem to support dismissal here.  I believe, 
rather, that Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1971), 
supports the district court's exercise of subject matter 
jurisdiction over Valhal's $2,000,000 claim.  In Nelson, we 
stated:  "'[W]here the jurisdictional issue cannot be stated 
  
without the ruling constituting at the same time a ruling on the 
merits, [the necessary choice] is to permit the cause to proceed 
to trial.'"  Id. at 292 (quoting Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280, 
285 (3d Cir. 1959)).  We went on to explain that our objective in 
deciding questions of jurisdictional amount is to locate only 
"those 'flagrant' cases where it can be determined in advance 
'with legal certainty' that the congressional mandate . . . was 
not satisfied."  Id. (emphasis added).  Here, the opinion of the 
Court demonstrates the necessity of resolving the dispute on the 
merits before the jurisdiction question could be decided.  
Accordingly, I think the mandate of the Court should be to vacate 
and remand the $1,000,000 judgment for Valhal with instructions 
to enter judgment for $50,000 instead of dismissing for lack of 
jurisdiction.2 
 In Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 
1989), we considered whether federal question claims were 
substantial enough to justify the district court in exercising 
federal question jurisdiction.  Finding that they were not 
"wholly insubstantial and frivolous," we held that the district 
court had jurisdiction.  Id. at 70 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 
678, 682-83 (1946).  We pointed out that "[t]he threshold to 
withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) is thus 
lower than that required to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion."  
                     
    
2I do not find it necessary on this petition for rehearing to 
decide the merits issue.  Accordingly, I take no position at this 
point on the merits of the state law question, as to which I am, 
as stated, dubitante. 
  
Id.  Similarly, in Batoff v. State Farm Insurance Co., 977 F.2d 
848 (3d Cir. 1992), after concluding that the claim of a non-
diverse defendant was not wholly insubstantial or frivolous, we 
remanded a removed case to the state court, recognizing that the 
remand could result in an order granting the defendant's motion 
to dismiss. 
 Our decision in Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 
F.2d 1039 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Upp v. Mellon Bank, 
N.A., 114 S. Ct. 440 (1993), holding that the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because "it [wa]s evident to a 
legal certainty that the requisite amount in controversy for 
diversity jurisdiction was never recoverable," is 
distinguishable.  Id. at 1042.  There, we were considering 
punitive damages that were "'patently frivolous and without 
foundation'" or "asserted solely or primarily for the purpose of 
conferring jurisdiction."  Id. at 1046 (citations omitted); see 
also In re Corestates Trust Fee Litig., 994 F.3d 61 (1994).  To 
read Packard more broadly brings it into tension with Batoff.  
See I.O.P. 9.1. 
 I think two cases from the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit concerning determination of the 
amount in controversy in a diversity case are instructive:   
Zacharia v. Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 684 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1982) 
and Ochoa v. Interbrew America, Inc., 999 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 
1993).  They aptly capture the distinction between cases in which 
the amount in controversy does not reach the jurisdictional 
amount and those that proceed to judgment on the merits because 
  
the amount initially in dispute is in excess of the 
jurisdictional requirement, even though the court may ultimately 
determine, on the merits, that the liability of the defendant is 
limited to a lesser amount.  In Zacharia, a hotel's liability was 
limited to $1,000 by statute.  The court held that the statutory 
limitation was a clear defense to liability that deprived the 
court of jurisdiction.  Zacharia, 684 F.2d at 202.  I agree.  In 
Ochoa, however, the court held, "[W]hen there is no claim of bad 
faith in asserting the jurisdictional amount, courts are 
permitted only to assess the allegations of the plaintiff's 
complaint and are to refrain from adjudicating the merits of the 
case."  Ochoa, 999 F.2d at 630.  I recognize that the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held "proof to a legal 
certainty that a plaintiff is not entitled to more than [the 
jurisdictional amount] overcomes even a good faith allegation 
that the jurisdiction amount is in controversy."  Sellers v. 
O'Connell, 701 F.2d 575, 571 (6th Cir. 1983).  I believe, 
however, that Sellers conflicts with Red Cab, our statement in 
Nelson and, by logical implication, our decisions in Batoff and 
Lunderstadt, and is wrongly decided. 
 For these reasons, I dissent from the order denying 
rehearing. 
 Judge Greenberg joins in this statement. 
